How likely does it have to be? (again)

Mario Loyola addresses the basis for invading Iraq in 2003. Given the nature of intelligence, there was no way to know for certain whether Saddam had WMD. What it ultimately comes down to is a matter of likelihood and probability.

Policymakers do not have the luxury of coming to no firm conclusion simply because the intel comes to no firm conclusion. What has been consistently missing from this whole debate is an appreciation of the fact that, given Saddam’s history, we had to presume the worst. By 2002, the only thing that could assuage our fears about Saddam was transparency in his regime. Without transparency, we were facing a potential threat of unknown scope that — should it ever materialize — could cause much more damage than a punitive action would be able to remediate.

And that meant that it was Saddam — not the United States — who had the burden of proof as to the WMDs. It was the administration’s failure to understand this and make this clear which has led to the widespread — and absolutely false — perception that because the pre-war intelligence was mistaken, it was a mistake to invade Iraq. If policy should never “cook” the intel, neither should intel “cook” the policy. Even if the administration had known how unreliable the CIA’s intel really was, the problem facing it would have been exactly the same.

So how likely does it have to be?

Even granting that the evidence of Saddam’s WMDs was less than a “slam dunk,” policymakers were still facing an uncertainty that was terrifying because of Saddam’s record and the lessons of September 11. What were policymakers supposed to do with this uncertainty? That was the real issue all along. Saddam’s claims to have disarmed were worthless without verification. What we needed was proof of disarmament, and only Saddam — or a military occupation — could provide that.

So what the administration did, without ever fully realizing it, was to assume the following strategic posture: Saddam has the burden of proof, and if he can’t fulfill it, we will get our answers from Central Command. The problem is that they arrived at this posture instinctively, rather than in any systematic and analytical way, and there was the policy failure. When Hans Blix reported to the Security Council that he could come to no conclusion about Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction because Saddam was not providing sufficient documentary evidence to justify a conclusion one way or the other, war became inevitable. But the administration still had not made it plain that an inconclusive inspections result would mean war.

I have repeatedly cited as an analogy the "fix-it" ticket I had back in 2005. I got pulled over and tagged for having a burnt-out headlight. I fixed it, and then I had to go to a Highway Patrol office to have someone look at the headlight and verify that it had been repaired.

It was not up to the police to hunt me down and verify that I had complied.

Hussein had been issued a "fix-it" ticket by the UN, and it was up to him to prove compliance, or face "serious consequences".