Steve Kellmeyer writes in the Mens News Daily blog on the relationship between science and theology. He lays the case that physics, and indeed all of science, as we know it, is inherently religious in its basis. (And that as a result, laws prohibiting the teaching of religion in science classes would mean we don't teach any science.)
The points he raises in support of this thesis are:
- The notion of an objective reality is a religious position.
To assert that reality is not an illusion, but is, in fact, substantial is to take sides in a long-standing religious debate.
The Hebrew and Christian faith insists on independent physical reality. The Hindu, the Buddhist, the Taoist traditions, along with any number of similar religious traditions, hold precisely the opposite viewpoint.
- Reality has a purpose.
...This is an important point, for investigation is only possible by means of a pre-existing purpose...
...the statement “reality exists” assumes not only that the investigator exists, it also assumes that the thing to be investigated has a “why” associated with it. In short, “reality exists” assumes the existence of purpose in both the investigator and the thing to be investigated.
This is a beautiful example of why they need to teach logic in grade school.
Take the assumption that an objective reality exists. This assumption is, indeed, absent in some religions and present in others, but this does not mean that it is inherently religious. It also does not mean that teaching that objective reality exists is ipso facto teaching religion.
The fallacy involved here is that of affirming the consequent.
This is an argument of the form: "If X, then Y." "We see Y", "therefore X".
In particular, "If religion A teaches idea I, then idea I will be taught wherever religion A is taught."
"We note idea I being taught in science classes."
"Therefore, religion A is taught in science classes."
Affirming the consequent is fallacious because the statement "if X, then Y" does not claim that X is the exclusive antecedent of Y. Suppose X is "a rock has fallen in the lake" and Y is "the rock is wet". Plugging those into the model of affirming the consequent, we get:
"If a rock has fallen in the lake, the rock is wet."
"The rock is wet".
"Therefore, the rock has fallen in the lake."
Falling in the lake is not the only way for a rock to get wet. A rock could be wet because it rained. The fact that a rock is wet is not proof that the rock in question fell in a lake. The fact that an idea is found in one religion, or a small set of religions, is not proof that the idea is inherently religious.
The second point is one I chose to break out as a separate premise. Kellmeyer considers objective reality to be inherently purposeful, and does not appear to consider the possibility of objective reality without purpose.
Here, Kellmeyer assumes his conclusion. This is known as Petitio Principii, or "begging the question". (Also "arguing in circles".) Kellmeyer sees purpose in the universe, so he assumes purpose in the universe.
There are any number of things in the universe for which no purpose can ever be proven. Radioactive material, for example, is composed of atoms which have a certain probability of decaying during any given time period. On average, some fraction of the atoms will decay during that time period. As near as can be determined, radioactive decay happens at random. No one has ever found a rule for telling which atom will decay when.
One could argue that each atomic decay occurs when and where it does for some purpose which may be known only to a Creator, but this is an assumption with no support other than a belief that things must happen for a reason.
The search for a unified field theory is one example of such an assumption in action. The hard sciences exist only because an ordered reality pre-exists them. If the universe were formless chaos, there would be no underlying reality upon which logic could function, nor, arguably, would there be a way to demonstrate the existence of logic at all. Logic would be the illusion instead of the tool.
One could argue, with equal validity, that we find rules in nature because we're good at finding patterns. The constellations in the night sky, for example, have been "discovered" by people, but this does not demonstrate that the stars were placed where they were in order to make any kind of pictures. The belief that the patterns we find in nature were created or ordained is a matter of religious faith. That patterns can be found is not. Neither is the statistical validity of any found patterns.
Finally, we see a habit of using scientific terms carelessly, in ways that scientists don't.
Physics tells us we can treat the particles that compose the universe as information packets. Physics does not point out the obvious: information exists only where purpose exists. Where reality is an illusion that repeats on an endlessly cyclic basis, there is no information to glean, no reality to tie together.
The problem here is one of equivocation. In particular, shifting between scientific and popular definitions of "information".
Popular definitions of "information" have connotations of meaning and the intent to communicate same. In this sense, random noise would have no meaning, and therefore would not be considered information.
Information theory defines "information" completely statistically. In essence, the more information any signal has, the more bits of data are required to make an exact copy of that signal. Random noise has the highest possible information content, and what we consider meaningful signals has a much lower information content.
By equating the scientific and popular senses of "information", Kellmeyer has stated that the more chaotic and unpredictable a system is (that is, the closer to pure random noise it is), the more purposeful it is.
I suspect this is not what he means.
