Iran's act of war

The editors of NRO ask several experts about the implications of Iran's seizure of 15 British sailors, and what should be done about it.

Nikolas K. Gvosdev, editor of The National Interest:

...there is no cost-free solution. No magic airstrike, no deus ex machine covert operation, no “grand bargain,” no display of Security Council unanimity over anemic sanctions, is going to result in an Iran that gives up its nuclear program, ends support for terrorism, stops its pursuit of regional hegemony and creates conditions for the disappearance of the Islamic Republic

Walid Phares, senior fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies:

...a multidimensional campaign should be launched, systematically yet gradually, instead of a single retaliation. Along with vigorous diplomatic pressures, the Coalition should formally condemn the regime and call for its isolation. It must create an unbalance of power with Iran via regional deployment while extending an emergency program of support to democracy forces within Iran, including a serious opposition broadcast.

Michael Rubin, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, is co-author of Eternal Iran: Continuity and Chaos (Palgrave, 2005):

That Iranian decision makers took such a step is not the result of too little diplomacy, but rather too much. Since Germany launched its critical dialogue with Iran in 1992, European countries have showered the Islamic Republic with apologies and incentives to compromise. Rather than abandon terrorism as a tool of state or reconsider its clandestine nuclear program, the Iranian government has redoubled its efforts to defy. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s May 31, 2006 offer to engage Tehran resulted not in a suspension of uranium enrichment, but rather public gloating by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei about U.S. weakness. Nor did the British “softly-softly” approach toward Tehran or its proxies in Basra bring peace in our time. Rather, it convinced the Revolutionary Guards that the British were targets of least resistance.

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Tehran has grown accustomed to expect reward for non-compliance. It is time U.S. officials if not their European counterparts recognize failure. Ratcheting up pressure only enables Iranian officials to adjust. True leverage requires comprehensive sanctions which can be lifted in response to changes in Tehran’s behavior. The West should abandon the illusion that factionalism within the Iranian government matters. The Office of the Supreme Leader has exercised remarkable control and coordination over its security apparatus. Presidents, whether pragmatic, reformist, or hardline, may differ in style, but have all operated toward the same goals. The White House should not differentiate between officials, power structures, and proxies and should hold the Iranian government accountable for all its actions.

Saul Singer, editorial-page editor of the Jerusalem Post:

Iran’s kidnapping of British soldiers from Iraqi waters is reminiscent of Hezbollah’s and Hamas’s kidnapping of Israeli soldiers, and of the seizure of the American embassy in Tehran in 1979. This is a regime that does not recognize basic notions of sovereignty and the rules of the game between nation states. Yes, it is an act of war, but this too, to the mullahs, is just another Western nicety to be ignored.

Iran is convinced that the more it plays hardball and breaks rules, the more the West will be intimidated and the safer the regime will be. The West must show this calculation is mistaken by raising the costs of Iranian behavior higher and faster, thereby deterring further Iranian escalation.

Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center.

Once again, Tehran is testing the waters to see just how far it can violate international law, this time by seizing 15 British sailors conducting anti-smuggling patrols in Iraqi territorial waters. The timing of this stunt — on the eve of unanimous passage of yet another United Nations Security Council Iran nuclear-sanctions resolution — suggests that it may have been an attempt to distract or a clumsy effort to intimidate. This much, however, is clear: Supporters of the U.N. and international law must now not only demand that Tehran return the sailors, but comply with the U.N.'s demand to stop exporting arms and making nuclear fuel (an activity that could bring Iran within days of acquiring a bomb). To help assure this result, states should also heed U.S. appeals against lending trade credits to Tehran, investing in its energy sector, or supporting its nuclear and long-range missile programs. Finally, states offering Tehran incentives (including the U.S.) need to insist that before Iran takes advantage of any such offers, it must first dismantle its nuclear fuel-making plants and allow the IAEA to conduct exhaustive wide-area surveillance to make sure Iran is entirely out of the bomb-making business. To attempt anything less only risks emboldening Iran even further.