The Un-Qaeda

This is part II of an exploration into the possibility of an anti-Qaeda -- an underground, stateless, anti-terror group.

In his controversial remarks a few weeks ago, Newt Gingrich wondered whether a new kind of Geneva Convention might be necessary:

"And, I further think that we should propose a Geneva convention for fighting terrorism which makes very clear that those who would fight outside the rules of law, those who would use weapons of mass destruction, and those who would target civilians are in fact subject to a totally different set of rules that allow us to protect civilization by defeating barbarism before it gains so much strength that it is truly horrendous."

Maybe international laws and treaties are just too clumsy to address such groups. Maybe, as is discussed in the article, it's necessary to fight fire with fire.

Might we then conceive of a similar organization that serves as an antibody?

What might be the characteristics of such an "Anti-Qaeda"?
One of the prerequisites would be freedom of movement: The forces of Anti-Qaeda would possess the ability, whether legal or not, to cross international borders at will.
Anti-Qaeda would be free to develop its own network of contacts throughout the world. Many of these would be within the intelligence agencies and militaries of established states. These contacts might actively feed information to Anti-Qaeda as a result of the policies of their states.
Alternatively, they might do so merely out of sympathy with the goals of Anti-Qaeda, and might be approached and recruited in the same manner that foreign intelligence agencies attempt.
One way or another, money would not be an issue for Anti-Qaeda. Through some system of donations, it might raise funds directly from sympathetic people all over the world. It might receive contributions from states, though it will be hesitant to do so if strings are attached. For example, a state might fund the organization with one large endowment-like contribution, allowing it to operate as a trust in perpetuity, though without any oversight from the state.
This comes to a final characteristic about Anti-Qaeda: it would operate best in an environment of state forbearance. States might gain information about Anti-Qaeda activities that would make for evidence in prosecutions, but they might decide not to enforce the law in the case of Anti-Qaeda.
All of the above describes how an organization such as Anti-Qaeda might be imagined. But it leaves out what its purpose might be. Would it be narrowly defined, such as merely chasing terrorists? Might it be broader in scope, such as commencing military activities against states that support terrorism? The answers to these will probably depend upon the nature of relationships that Anti-Qaeda has with states in the West who will be best positioned to thwart its goals, whatever they are. In fact, whereas the critical vulnerabilities of other military forces in the past have been national will, or materiel and logistics, or doctrine, Anti-Qaeda's might be its relationships with states that can stop it.

And of course, if any of the Anti-Qaeda's forces should be caught or killed, the Secretary will disavow any knowledge of their actions...