How's the enemy doing in Iraq?

(Hat tip: PrariePundit)

The facts on the ground are that the two chief enemies of the new Iraq - the groups wearing the al Qaeda label and the Iran-backed Shiite militias - are not doing well. Indeed, one might say that both have already lost their bids for power and, the continued killings notwithstanding, are in the process of marginalization. The only way they could make a comeback is if Congress decides to legislate a victory for them.

Al Qaeda's strategy had two parts. One was based on the assumption that, by killing enough Americans, it would enable the party of defeat in the United States to force President Bush to surrender. That failed when Bush decided to increase, rather than reduce, the number of U.S. troops in Iraq.

The other part assumed that, by fomenting a sectarian war, al Qaeda would force Shiites, Iraq's majority, to run away - allowing Salafi Sunnis to seize power in Baghdad. That also failed: Not only did the Shiites not run away,but also many who had fled under Saddam Hussein decided to return to Iraq.

...

Here are some other facts on how the enemy is doing right now:

• The main Arab Sunni armed groups (including the 1920 Brigade and the Islamic Army of Iraq) have switched sides, agreeing to work with the Iraqi government against foreign terrorists.
• The Sunni Arab tribal sheiks in once-unruly Anbar province have decided to come off the fence and take up arms against al Qaeda, even if this means collaborating with the Americans.
• On the Shiite side, Muqtada al-Sadr ordered his Mahdi Army to lay down arms for six months. He made that decision after dozens of his commanders, former members of Saddam's Republican Guards, had switched to the government side.
• Sadr also saw the writing on the wall after his gunmen tried to seize power in Karbala, Najaf, Wassit, Misan, Dhiqar and Qaddisiyah - and failed.
• ....

As in any war, what counts in this war is the protagonists' states of mind. No war is won with a defeatist discourse.

The "surge" was a political signal that the United States did not intend to abandon its allies. That signal persuaded fence-sitters in Iraq - and, beyond it, in the broader Arab world - to take sides. Most chose the side of new Iraq against its internal and external foes.

America and its Iraqi allies can't be defeated in Iraq. But defeat could be manufactured in Washington, where part of the U.S. elite seeks it in order to win in the domestic political war.

Each time an American politician speaks of defeat, he encourages the terrorists, discourages allies, signals to fence sitters to look elsewhere - and thus prolongs the war.