Eminent domain case

(Hat tip: ScotusBlug.)

Sometimes, there's very interesting (downright entertaining) reading in court opinions. Here's an example from the dissent to Kelo v. City of New London:

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The Fifth Amendment provides:

...nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

It is the last of these liberties, the Takings Clause, that is at issue in this case. Though one component of the protection provided by the Takings Clause is that the government can take private property only if it provides "just compensation" for the taking, the Takings Clause also prohibits the government from taking property except "for public use." Were it otherwise, the Takings Clause would either be meaningless or empty. If the Public Use Clause served no function other than to state that the government may take property through its eminent domain power–for public or private uses–then it would be surplusage.

Precedent holds that "no clause in the Constitution can be assumed to be without effect". That is, there are no surplus words in the Constitution. Of course, there's another possible effect these words could have. Taken at face value, and applying the rules of logic, we note the Takings Clause says that if property is taken for public use, the State must pay "just compensation". However, the statement is, technically silent about the taking of property for other uses.

Alternatively, the Clause could distinguish those takings that require compensation from those that do not. That interpretation, however, "would permit private property to be taken or appropriated for private use without any compensation whatever."

One wonders if that's where the law is headed.

Certainly this Justice considers the precedent set here a dangerous one.

The consequences of today’s decision are not difficult to predict, and promise to be harmful. So-called “urban renewal” programs provide some compensation for the properties they take, but no compensation is possible for the subjective value of these lands to the individuals displaced and the indignity inflicted by uprooting them from their homes. Allowing the government to take property solely for public purposes is bad enough, but extending the concept of public purpose to encompass any economically beneficial goal guarantees that these losses will fall disproportionately on poor communities. Those communities are not only systematically less likely to put their lands to the highest and best social use, but are also the least politically powerful. If ever there were justification for intrusive judicial review of constitutional provisions that protect "discrete and insular minorities," surely that principle would apply with great force to the powerless groups and individuals the Public Use Clause protects. The deferential standard this Court has adopted for the Public Use Clause is therefore deeply perverse. It encourages "those citizens with disproportionate influence and power in the political process, including large corporations and development firms" to victimize the weak.